

GERMAN PENETRATION OF THE MIDDLE EAST THROUGH POLISH AGENTS.

1. There have recently been indications of an increase in the Germans' use of Polish agents to penetrate the Middle East, whether for espionage or subversive political purposes. The following is a summary of our recent information on this subject.

(a) Indrzej Dabinski.

A man aged forty-six who had served in the last war, arrived in TURKEY from BULGARIA in March 1943 without papers. He told our interrogator that after the Battle of Poland he became a member of a Polish underground organization, and with their knowledge came into contact with an anti-Carist officer, Wladimir SZYBLOWSKI (alias von KUCHMAN), Chief of Staff of the German-sponsored "Free Russian Movement"; the Poles declare that SZYBLOWSKI is also an Abwehr agent. Just before Germany invaded the USSR SZYBLOWSKI invited DABINSKI to go via SWEDEN to England to put the "Free Russian" case to the Polish and British governments. A later proposal was that Dabinski should take his way through USSR as a refugee and get in touch with General ANDRZEJ in the Middle East; but both schemes were abandoned. Eventually, however, SZYBLOWSKI persuaded the Abwehr that he was in touch with a group of exiled Polish anti-officers, who disapproved of General SZYBLOWSKI's moderate attitude towards the USSR, and suggested that DABINSKI, as a member of this group, should be sent to the Middle East to cause dissension in, and obtain military information from, the Polish Forces. Throughout, according to his own statement, DABINSKI's organization agreed with the scheme, under cover of which it was intended that he should act in the Middle East on behalf of the Polish underground organization. He travelled to BERLIN and thence to SOFIA in Jan/Feb 1943, contacted by an Abwehr officer, crossed the frontier into Turkey alone, and was detained by the Turks for six weeks at EDIRNE (Adrianople). Eventually he was reported to ISTANBUL and handed over to the Polish Consul, who informed our representatives and finally sent him on to SYRIA.

(b) Stanislaw SZADKOWSKI & Stanislaw SZADKOWSKI.

A Polish officer aged forty, became a member of a Polish underground organization, and early in 1941 came into touch with the "Free Russians". In December 1941 he and some other officers were sent by Wladimir SZYBLOWSKI, Director of the "Free Russians", into the USSR, to make contact with the Polish Forces, then in process of formation there, and to obtain answers to an Abwehr intelligence questionnaire. They were arrested by the Soviet authorities and handed over to the Poles in the USSR for trial by military court. SZADKOWSKI was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment.

(c) DABINSKI has now admitted that he knew of the sending of SZADKOWSKI and his associates into the USSR. Their cases are closely analogous in:

1. Their enlistment through the "Free Russians for the Abwehr."
2. Their departure on a mission from a Polish underground organization to the Polish Forces in Allied territory, with whom their organization was not then in touch.
3. Their directives from the "Free Russians" and from the Abwehr.

The Poles declare significantly that Colonel Bygnant POLAK, described by DABINSKI as the head of the underground organization to which he belonged, had in fact recently entered into close collaboration with SZADKOWSKI and was not connected with the main Polish underground movement.

(d) Though there are still a number of inconsistencies in DABINSKI's narrative, the interrogators consider that he is probably a well-meaning man, who had lost his political bearings in a mad world and was brought in touch with SZYBLOWSKI by his admitted hatred of the Soviet. SZYBLOWSKI and SZYBLOWSKI are probably playing a subtle double game, fully cooperating with the Abwehr in the recent past, but with a growing desire to renege themselves with the Allies as Axis prospects of victory recede. With our knowledge of the mediocrity of the average Abwehr officer, it is not too much to suppose that some of them would readily accept the "Free Russians" offer of Polish for the penetration of the Poles in the USSR and the Middle East, and quite

possible that the Abwehr briefing might be as sketchy as that which DANKOWSKI has described. One is left with the feeling that in these two cases the types "business" may have been the motive force, which the Abwehr have hoped to steer and utilize for their own purposes, and that these two bewildered Poles are merely third-class passengers on the "Grandes Lignes Europeennes".

12. Stanislaw KURCZYNSKI, aged twenty-nine, arrived in TURKEY from enemy territory in July 1945. He has admitted that he was sentenced in 1937 to three years imprisonment by the Poles for espionage on behalf of an Ukrainian separatist organization through according to his original statement this sentence was for subsequent talk when employed on frontier defenses. Again according to his original statement, he became a member of the Polish underground organization ZIX in May 1940, and when in May 1941 he was conscripted for labor in Germany took with him a directive from ZIX to penetrate the Germans by passing himself off as a White Russian and the son of a White Russian officer with strong anti-Soviet views. In June 1942 a White Russian official suggested that he would be of use to the Germans for contacts with ZIX, who approved his recruitment by the S.D. that he failed to make contact with ZIX, and decided on his own responsibility to continue his association with the Germans; and most recently he has admitted that he has never associated with ZIX. The interview therefore is that he has been passing German agents from at least the beginning of the war. In December the S.D. made the definite proposal that he should join the Polish forces in the Middle East for the purpose of sabotage and espionage, and his training began. KURCZYNSKI states that on 20 February 1943 he was arrested by the Gestapo on suspicion of being a Polish agent. He was released on signing a declaration of loyalty to the S.D. His final instructions before departure were to report to the Polish Consulate at ISTANBUL and obtain employment with Polish forces or in some sort of military installation. When planned, he was to keep the fact of sending a cipher letter to an address in PARIS. He was to arrange for the letter to be carried by hand to TURKEY and posted there. Eventually a man would make himself known to him by means of a prearranged conversation and give him further instructions. The investigation of KURCZYNSKI is still in progress, and some of the above material may undergo modifications.

III. From Paris to the VANDERBILT

(a) In his original story claimed to be a Dutch merchant aged 39 who was a member of a Dutch underground organization. He travelled to WARSAW with a Polish friend who recommended him to a Polish underground organization known as YING (Sound and Plough). This organization provided him a false German passport and sent him on various missions to GERMANY. In July 1943 he was ordered to contact a Polish woman named MARIA to GERMANY. He had already been on a preliminary visit in June, and arranged with the Greek underground organization S.D. to send her on to the Middle East. There was considerable delay in developing the plan of detaching this woman by British aircraft from a secret airfield, and in October 1943 she returned to Vienna. Then for an unspecified reason he travelled to TURKEY, and met in ANKARA the woman's cousin who put him in touch with the Polish authorities. He informed them that he had come from Warsaw flying with letters, including some for General ANKARA.

(b) However, when this information brought him to ANKARA, he was in reality a German spy who had been employed by the German intelligence apparatus as early as 1936. He was sent to Istanbul by the German intelligence in pursuit of the Polish underground organization. The Germans had considerable success in penetrating Polish underground organizations, including those having and the CIA (Czechoslovakian intelligence organization) and those having and the ZIX; some of the leading Polish personalities in the first two of these organizations were in fact German double agents. These last two were to

states the much-and-file in an anti-Soviet direction. In the course of his work KERT came into touch with ANDRZEJ and Dr. GAD, whom he described as the political and military chiefs respectively of the Wlasc-l-Plug, and MAJOWSKI who was in fact a clandestinely double-agent. He discussed with them the possibility of a Polish underground double-agent, became evident that Ant IV's attitude to Wlasc-l-Plug was deteriorating, and in order to reverse the situation GAD proposed that he should go himself to the Middle East, where he hoped to obtain an agreement from General ANDRZEJ that the Polish forces there would declare themselves anti-Soviet and lay down their arms against the Germans; General ANDRZEJ, it was hoped, would send OFFICERS to Poland to organize resistance to the Soviets. In March 1943, KERT submitted these proposals to higher authority but they were turned down since they did not accord with Himmler's policy of eradicating the Poles from the Lublin district and Ant IV placed KERT on a charge of smearing his duties in these negotiations with the Poles. While he was awaiting court-martial however, Ant IV placed KERT on a charge of smearing his duties in these negotiations with the Poles. While he was awaiting court-martial however, Ant IV of the Glab-Bast to sound the morale of the Polish forces and establish a political information service communicating by courier.

Accordingly he made a preliminary visit to GURKIN with Dr. GAD, who had been there previously and was in touch with some Greek underground organizations. By August a scheme was prepared. The treacherous Wlasc-l-Plug leaders produced the woman agent Maria Jostkowiczna alias Wanda, whom KERT was to escort to GURKIN. (KERT declares that though JOSTKOWICZNA knew of the German penetration of the organization with the Germans, she was not aware of penetration of their Polish colleagues and did not realize the German Middle East, either by British liaison aircraft or to send her on to the carry a dispatch by which the Polish authorities of occupied. She was to communicate by R/T with Wlasc-l-Plug MAJOWSKI had given a photostat of this to Ant IV so that they could monitor the transmissions.

(e) There was however a hitch in the despatch of JOSTKOWICZNA from KERT, possibly because K.A.K. suspected her, and it was decided that KERT should go to ARABA and make touch with the Polish authorities through JOSTKOWICZNA's cousin. At ARABA a Polish officer suggested that he should travel with him to ALIPO and put the proposition direct to General ANDRZEJ; he was not to say anything about it to the British. KERT says he considered that if he returned to GURKIN the court-martial by Ant IV was still hanging over him, and he possibly related further punishment for making the journey to ARABA without the authority of Ant IV, by whom he was still officially employed. He therefore related before the Anglo-Persian Travellers' Examination Centre, but at ALIPO he came to the Anglo-Persian Travellers' Examination Centre, to whom he told his Dutch story. This they found unsatisfactory, and forwarded him to SIDG for close interrogation.

(d) KERT's complicated relations with both Ant IV and Ant VI are not cleared up; it will not be possible to define with certainty the extent of German penetration of the Poles or the details of KERT's relation to GURKIN and TURKEY.

IV. JOSEPH RUDOLPH KERT, a Jew, made touch in the autumn of 1943 with a British organization in GURKIN, who suspected him and brought him to the Middle East for interrogation. He has admitted that he had been employed with the German Film Institute and has brought him to confess that he had been involved as a propaganda agent and sent by the Germans to whip up anti-Soviet feeling in the Polish forces, but has later retracted both confessions, pretending that he made them in fear of his

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Appendix "A" (Continued)

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life. In mental capacity and general intelligence he is thought to be of less importance than either SWEDKOWSKI or MERZ. The interrogation continues.

V. Ronald BUCKINSKI and Helena LUCJA (or LUCYNA) BUCKINSKA-ROSSI.

(a) Ronald BUCKINSKI of ISTANBUL has long been suspected of being a German agent, though there is no proof of this. The Poles have had information, of unknown reliability, that he has been working for the Soviet S.S. since 1937, and for the Germans since 1939. His employer is stated to be Admiral von der MARCKE, and he is said to have been in touch with the known German agents Angel KILLANDER and Frans KNAUS.

(b) His stepdaughter Helena Lucja (or Lucyna) OYCHERSKAJA, now aged thirty-two, adopted his surname BUCKINSKI (in the feminine). She has been a Polish diplomatic employee since 1929, and while in the Legation at BELGRADE married ROSSI, described as an Italian of doubtful character, whom she afterwards divorced. Shortly before the German invasion of Yugoslavia she came to ISTANBUL where she became in close touch with her stepfather. In October 1941 she was engaged as confidential secretary by Adam Nowina KURCJUSZ an S.S. officer in the Polish Consulate at ISTANBUL. In the following August the Poles received a report that a woman employed in the Polish Consulate, and answering to BUCKINSKA's description, was a German agent. Further inquiry produced the allegations that she was helping her stepfather to make contact with arrivals from Europe on behalf of the Germans, paid occasional visits to the German Embassy in ISTANBUL, and had worked for the Soviet in Yugoslavia in 1940. Her employment with KURCJUSZ was therefore terminated in June 1943 and she came to Jerusalem, where she is said to be the mistress of Aleksey WIZIKOWSKI, the Polish Consul.

(c) There is clearly not at present sufficient firm evidence against BUCKINSKA to subject her to interrogation, in view of her protected position, and we are informed that her stepfather is both a frightened and a wily man who is unlikely to be decoyed into Allied territory where he could be interrogated. The Poles themselves, who usually see counter-espionage cases in strong shades of black or white, admit that the information against him is scrappy and inconclusive. For the present therefore, both parties remain under observation.

VI. CONCLUSIONS.

(a) Even in the unfinished state of a number of these cases, it is evident that the Germans are trying to exploit the anti-Soviet sentiments of a large number of Poles in order to subvert their loyalty to the Allied cause. MERZ's disclosures about the extent of German penetration of Kiecki-Pling are apparently confirmed by the Polish authorities, though they deny that other organizations are penetrated to a similar degree. It is very possible that the Polish authorities are concealing from us the extent to which anti-Soviet sentiments are affecting Polish solidarity with the Allies, both in enemy-occupied and Allied territory.

(b) It would certainly appear from the DEBNICKI and MERZ cases that some German organizations have hopes of undermining Polish loyalty to the Allies, and it is significant that these two agents apparently intended to make touch with General ANDERS, who ever since the Soviet's entry into the war has been regarded as leader of the anti-Soviet faction in the Polish Army in opposition to the more moderate attitude of General BUKRESKI.

(c) The two important recent arrivals, SWEDKOWSKI and MERZ, were controlled by the political Reichsicherheitshauptamt, and not by the military Abwehr, whose Amt II had had so little success in the last three years in political and subversive penetration in the Middle East. Attention has been drawn to the fact that DEBNICKI, SWEDKOWSKI and MERZ